Houssam El-Eid

There is an idea that is becoming almost axiomatic in Lebanese political life today. Whenever the discussion turns to restoring the state, the future of Hezbollah, or rebuilding the national balance, the debate sooner or later comes back to the same question: how do we build an independent Shiite political dynamic? It is difficult to challenge this question. It seems logical, even self-evident. Any national project naturally needs an independent Shiite presence, and the monopoly of any single force over the representation of an entire community must come to an end. But the most dangerous ideas are not those that appear to be wrong. They are those that seem so self-evident that we stop questioning them.

Let us set aside, if only for a moment, the objections raised by the framework agreement, the political divisions it has generated, and the conflicting positions it has provoked. Instead, let us ask a different question, one that may prove even more important than the agreement itself because it concerns what comes next. If we assume that Lebanon is moving, sooner or later, toward bringing its state of conflict with its regional environment to an end, and that the Middle East is gradually entering a new phase in relations among states, does the Lebanese state have a clear vision of what it wants from this new chapter? Has anyone even begun to consider Lebanon’s future economic and political position should the regional order that has shaped the country for decades begin to change?