IMF Concludes Its Mission: Who Will Finance the Return of Deposits?

Following the conclusion of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) mission in Beirut, and as Lebanon prepares to make decisive decisions on the restructuring of the banking sector and the future of deposits, the country now finds itself at a critical turning point.

In April 2025, I described the agreement Lebanon was seeking with the IMF as “the world’s most expensive visa.” Today, following the IMF’s latest visit to Beirut, that phrase takes on an even more obvious meaning.

The staff-level agreement reached with the IMF in April 2022 involved financing of around $3 billion, subject to the completion of the required prior actions and approval by the Fund’s relevant governing bodies. Above all, the agreement was intended to serve as a certificate of confidence and credibility, enabling Lebanon to subsequently attract much larger amounts of Arab and international financing.

The objective is legitimate. But one question remains: what will the real price of this visa be, and above all, who will have to pay it?

If $3 billion is to open the doors to international financing for Lebanon, but at the cost of wiping out tens of billions of dollars belonging to depositors, Lebanon will indeed have obtained the most expensive visa in its history.

The conclusions published by the IMF following its mission to Lebanon from September 15 to 18, 2026, now add a crucial element to this debate.

The Fund stressed the need to respect the hierarchy of creditors and the principle that depositors should not incur any losses before shareholders and subordinated creditors.

This is a fundamental principle.

But the essential question remains unanswered:

Where is the financing?

Because no banking restructuring law, however precise or sophisticated, can by itself generate the tens of billions of dollars needed to return deposits.

Banks can be restructured, responsibilities allocated, viable institutions identified, and, when necessary, struggling banks resolved or orderly liquidated. But before any liquidation, each bank’s situation must be examined in accordance with the procedures laid down by law and with due respect for the rights of the various parties concerned.

The question that has been put off for years therefore remains:

Who will finance the return of deposits?

The state?

The Banque du Liban?

The banks and their shareholders?

Future state revenues or some of its assets?

Or some fair and carefully considered combination of these different resources?

This is the real heart of the problem.

The IMF itself is calling for any mechanism to recover deposits to be compatible both with the future viability of the banking sector and with the sustainability of public debt.

In other words, it is no longer enough to allocate the losses on paper: a genuine, credible and workable financing mechanism must be put in place.

The Lebanese state cannot be absent from this equation. Its responsibilities, as well as those of the Banque du Liban, must be examined in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Money and Credit, particularly Article 113, whose provisions must be applied and interpreted within the relevant legal and institutional framework.

For decades, decisions on public spending were made by successive governments, adopted or overseen by state institutions, and implemented through public mechanisms. A lasting solution to the crisis cannot now be sought by ignoring this history.

Another point deserves particular emphasis: the September mission concluded without any announcement of a new financing agreement with the IMF.

The discussions are ongoing.

This means Lebanon still has an opportunity to pursue a balanced solution: restructure its banking sector, hold shareholders accountable wherever required by law, restore confidence, preserve the state’s future capacity, and, above all, protect depositors’ legitimate rights to the greatest extent possible.

The IMF can offer Lebanon a visa that would enable it to regain its place in the international financial community.

But the price of that visa cannot be the disappearance of Lebanese depositors’ savings.

Before asking depositors to bear the cost, the authorities must establish responsibility, identify the available resources, and finally present the Lebanese people with a serious and credible plan for returning their deposits.

Because no country can rebuild its banking system by sacrificing the trust of those who entrusted it with their savings.