EEZ Lebanon-Cyprus: between legal gains and maritime losses

The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation agreement between Lebanon and Cyprus, signed on November 26, 2025, and endorsed by Decree No. 2108 of December 16, 2025, marks a major step in Lebanese maritime policy. Officially presented as a means to guarantee the exploitation of maritime resources, this agreement nevertheless raises deep concerns from legal and strategic perspectives.

General Khalil Gemayel, an expert in maritime border delimitation, believes that this agreement, despite some advantages, remains largely unfavorable to Lebanon. It certainly puts an end to a long-standing dispute, but at what cost?

According to him, one of the main achievements lies in the resolution of the maritime dispute that had pitted Lebanon and Cyprus against each other for nearly two decades. This legal clarification puts an end to a grey area that hindered any energy planning. He also emphasizes that the agreement officially extended the Lebanese maritime border with Cyprus from point No. 1 to point No. 23, now a maritime junction point between Lebanon, Cyprus, and Israel. However, this extension was carried out using the Median Line Method, an approach that, according to General Gemayel, clearly favors Cyprus. He believes that the resolution of the dispute, despite its apparent importance, was made at the expense of Lebanese interests.

An Unequal Agreement

General Gemayel considers the agreement unfair to Lebanon due to the methodology adopted. He explains that the delimitation is based on a median line drawn between an island, Cyprus, and a continental coastal state, Lebanon. However, international maritime jurisprudence favors a three-stage methodology: the drawing of a provisional median line, the consideration of relevant circumstances, and then the conduct of a final Proportionality Test. He regrets that this approach was not applied, due to the absence of a proportionality test between the lengths of the opposing coasts.

In this context, General Gemayel specifies that the relevant Lebanese coast extends for approximately 188 kilometers, compared to 103 kilometers for the corresponding Cypriot coast. This ratio of 1.82 in favor of Lebanon, versus 1 for Cyprus, should have led to a more balanced delimitation. According to his analysis, the non-observance of this principle resulted in the loss of approximately 2,600 square kilometers of Lebanon's exclusive economic zone to Cyprus.

He adds that the 2025 agreement essentially adopts the same delimitation methodology as the one adopted in the agreement signed in 2007 between the two countries. This text, which had not been ratified or applied due to its imbalances, had remained frozen for nearly 18 years.

An Institutional Contradiction

General Gemayel highlights an institutional contradiction. He recalls that in 2022, a joint Lebanese ministerial commission was formed to examine the issue of maritime borders with Cyprus. This commission had recommended the adoption of the three-stage methodology and the consideration of proportionality between the coasts, explicitly recognizing that the median line was detrimental to Lebanon. Yet, in 2025, a new ministerial commission, composed of the same ministries, overturned the previous recommendations and validated the delimitation based on the median line. This is precisely the method that Lebanon had long rejected and which led to the freezing of the 2007 agreement.

From Legal Agreement to Sovereignty Challenges

Beyond General Gemayel's technical analysis, this agreement illustrates a recurring problem in international negotiations: the search for a quick and clear solution can come at the expense of technical principles and long-term strategic interests. The fundamental achievement of the agreement – the legal clarification of maritime borders and the end of the historical dispute with Cyprus – is undeniable and offers legal stability likely to encourage investment in maritime areas.

However, the methodology adopted reflects a disregard for internationally recognized technical standards, particularly the final proportionality test. The use of the median line without adjustment for coast length indicates a political compromise, likely motivated by the desire to quickly conclude an agreement after 18 years of deadlock. This choice leaves Lebanon facing a tangible loss of exploitable maritime areas.

This strategic choice, while providing clear borders, weakens future economic prospects, particularly concerning gas and oil resources. Finally, the discrepancy between the 2022 commission's recommendations and the 2025 final approval highlights a persistent governance problem in Lebanon: the continuity of the technical and institutional approach is sometimes sacrificed for the sake of opportunistic political decisions. The result is an agreement that provides border clarity but raises legitimate questions about the protection of national interests and the country's ability to adopt a coherent and sustainable maritime strategy.