

Two major developments mark the start of the week: Washington’s extraordinary economic and financial offensive against Iran – dubbed the “economic D-Day” – and, in Lebanon, the resurgence of the case of Mohammad Reza Chibani, Iran’s designated but unaccredited ambassador to Beirut. The significance of the barrage of sanctions announced by Washington on Monday lies in its direct consequences across multiple fronts, both in the short and medium term, for Iran’s economy, the survival of the mullahs’ regime, the regional balance of power and even international relations, particularly with China. The Mohammad Chibani affair, of course, is in no way comparable to the economic D-Day. Above all, however, it puts the Lebanese authorities’ ability to maintain consistency between their words and their actions to the test. It matters because it represents yet another test for a Lebanese state that has long struggled to assert its authority. On Monday, August 24, official Lebanon failed the test once again.
The measures announced as part of the economic D-Day are unprecedented in every respect – both in form and in substance – insofar as they shake the global economy as a whole while simultaneously strangling the Iranian regime economically. The sanctions target every sector: gold, technology, digital assets, oil, the banking, aviation and shipping. The ultimatum issued by the U.S. Treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, leaves no room for ambiguity: countries that do business with Iran must fall into line or risk being isolated themselves. Worse still, he warned, they risk being removed from the U.S. dollar system. “No one should test our resolve,” Bessent warned, adding that “gray spaces no longer exist.” “It is now time for world leaders to make a decision between peace and terror, America and Iran,” he declared.
No exceptions – least of all for China, Tehran’s strategic partner, with which Donald Trump had nevertheless opened a new chapter, and which now finds itself back in Washington’s crosshairs. Beijing had recently expressed its displeasure with Washington’s new strategy towards Iran.
Bessent responded bluntly when asked about the matter: “If Beijing facilitates Iranian transactions, it will be targeted.” For the U.S. official, such transactions, whatever their nature, amount to “money laundering on behalf of Iran.”
The Treasury Secretary said he “expected a major institution to be sanctioned this week,” without providing further detail, but indicated that, even as he spoke, “around 60 entities with ties to Tehran had just been sanctioned.”
Bank Melli, along with other Iranian institutions, was ordered to “close all its branches around the world.”
According to Bessent, Iran “faces a very clear choice, with only two possible paths: complete isolation and a subsistence economy, or a return to normalcy with the opportunity to rejoin the global economy,” he said, calling on Iranian soldiers to lay down their arms. “Remember that the Berlin Wall fell when ordinary soldiers decided not to shoot on their fellow citizens,” he told them.
In an initial reaction, the Tasnim news agency, which is close to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, sought to play down the significance of the unprecedented new round of sanctions, “as the Pakistani mediator is in Tehran.” It attributed the move to Donald Trump’s “repeated media and psychological operations,” citing an Iranian official source. According to that same source, “nothing will change on the ground.” A message essentially intended for domestic consumption, because the situation on the ground will, precisely, no longer be the same.
Panic in Tehran
Announced by President Donald Trump on Wednesday, the economic D-Day – a reference to the Allied landings in Normandy in June 1944, which hastened the collapse of the Nazi regime in Germany during the Second World War – could deliver a decisive blow to Iran if it is fully implemented and maintained in the absence of a diplomatic breakthrough. The choice of name for the draconian measures Washington intends to impose on the Islamic Republic and its recalcitrant partners is no accident. The sanctions, which Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent describes as the “largest financial offensive ever undertaken,” would mark the final chapter of a war that has been raging in various forms since February 28.
Iranians are well aware of this, as shown by the rial’s precipitous fall – it was trading at more than 2 million to the dollar on Monday – and, above all, by the palpable panic within the ranks of the regime. Since Sunday, official statements and commentary have been coming thick and fast, in an Iran that continues to send contradictory signals, ranging from direct threats against the United States and countries that might join the new sanctions regime, to clear signals in favor of a political solution to the conflict, interspersed with grandiose claims about Iranian resilience and military capabilities. So much so that President Massoud Pezeshkian felt compelled to call for “unity of positions in the face of American threats.” Conspicuously absent from this chorus of statements was Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei.
Can Iran withstand the American sledgehammer? Impossible, given the severity of the U.S. sanctions and the scale of the financial and inflation crisis that has gripped the country for months and has been compounded by the U.S. naval blockade.
One need only look at Iranian oil exports to grasp the depth of the financial crisis gripping the mullahs’ regime. From nearly two million barrels a day before the February war, exports had fallen to around 400,000 by mid-August.
In any event, faced with this economic D-Day, Iranian authorities said on Monday evening that they had drawn up a “two-year plan” – that is, one extending until the end of President Donald Trump’s term – to weather this economic war.
What role for diplomacy?
Despite the pressure it is under, Tehran still refuses to back down over what it calls its right to control the Strait of Hormuz – at least publicly, as Pakistan has stepped up its diplomatic efforts in the hope of a breakthrough that would bring Iran and the United States back to the negotiating table and ease tensions on the ground. Yemen’s Houthi militia, meanwhile, continued to target Saudi sites on Monday, including in the Red Sea.
Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is currently in Tehran for talks with Iranian officials. According to Reuters, he spoke by phone with Donald Trump last week.
Oman’s foreign minister, Badr al-Busaidi, is due to follow him to the Iranian capital on Tuesday for talks on the Strait of Hormuz.
The Unfortunate Chibani Affair
In any event, if it continues without a diplomatic breakthrough, the economic D-Day will undoubtedly affect countries across the region where Tehran maintains influence through its armed proxies – Hezbollah in Lebanon, armed factions in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.
Two significant developments stand out in this context: Baghdad has delayed the timetable for disarming pro-Iranian armed groups, without explaining the change or setting a new deadline.
Launched in June, the process was supposed to be completed by September 30, when the mission of the U.S.-led international coalition against Islamic State in Iraq is due to end. Under pressure from Iran, however, some groups refused to lay down their arms, arguing that doing so would benefit the United States and Israel. Seeking to avoid armed confrontations and favoring dialogue, the Iraqi authorities adjusted their timetable without ever changing the original deadline. Iraq’s decision to abandon that deadline can only be explained by increased Iranian pressure, which has pushed Ali al-Zaidi’s government to slow the process already under way.
The same is true in Lebanon, where Iran’s designated but unaccredited ambassador, Mohammad Reza Chibani, is holding on to his post, even though he was declared persona non grata and ordered by the Foreign Ministry to leave the country in March.
In practical terms, Chibani has been in an irregular situation in Lebanon since March 24, since his visa ceased to be valid once he was declared persona non grata. Nevertheless, the authorities have done nothing to enforce the decision they themselves took, thus failing an initial test of their authority.
On Monday, they squandered a second opportunity to prove their credibility, as Iran’s representative managed to obtain a six-month residence permit from General Security on the grounds that he was a former ambassador who had served in Lebanon from 2006 to 2009.
This maneuver, however, does little to conceal the enormous gulf between officials’ statements about their determination to shield Lebanon from foreign influence and actions that run directly counter to those stated intentions.
Only Foreign Minister Joe Raggi has remained true to his position, saying a few days ago in an interview with An-Nahar that there is no question of reversing the decisions taken last March.
The renewal of Chibani’s residence permit is a humiliation for the authorities, showing that they lack the resolve to enforce their own decisions, whatever pretexts they may offer – all the more so given that Hezbollah, which answers directly to Iran, continues to defy them. This was demonstrated once again by one of the group’s MPs, Hassan Fadlallah, who, during a meeting in Tehran with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, spoke as though he were representing Lebanon, going so far as to call for “concerted action” with the Islamic Republic to confront Israel’s ongoing military operations in Lebanon.
Syria Removed from the Terrorism List
Against this backdrop of mounting tensions, one development of major importance remains to be noted – a move whose symbolic significance and timing are hard to miss. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on Monday evening the official removal of Syria from the list of state sponsors of international terrorism.
At the same time, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the organization formerly led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa who was then known by the alias al-Jolani, was also removed from the list of international terrorist organizations.
The strategic impact of the move will be to pave the way for private investment in Syria, thereby helping to revive the Syrian economy and allowing post-Assad Syria to rejoin the global economic system.